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Our strength as a nation state will continue to be challenged by those who employ a 
strategy of the weak using international fora, judicial processes, and terrorism. We 
have learned that an unrivalled capacity to respond to traditional challenges is no lon-
ger sufficient. Battlefield success is only one element of our long-term, multi-faceted 
campaign against terrorism. Non-military components of this campaign include strate-
gic communications, law enforcement operations, and economic sanctions.  
Donald Rumsfeld: 2005 US National Defense Strategy 
 
Introduction 
In the aftermath of 9/11 the extent to which forces and processes operating within global a-
renas are in the midst of transforming the shape and character of the world within which we 
live have become alarmingly self-evident. Thanks to recent technological advances, capital, 
goods and labour can now move around the globe at wholly unprecedented speeds, and at 
costs which are following and equally rapid decline. The world has shrunk, such that transna-
tional connections have become the order of the day. 
However the costs and benefits of this shrinkage have been far from uniform. Critics of these 
processes regularly argue that the benefits of globalisation have overwhelmingly fallen into 
the hands of the haves, whilst plunging the have-nots into positions of ever-deeper disadvan-
tage. In historical terms there is a great deal of substance to that argument. Since 1492 – 
which simultaneously marked the fall of the Emirate of Granada and the departure of Colum-
bus on his initial voyage of discovery – western Europe embarked on an immensely success-
ful process of globalisation from above. By the beginning of the twentieth century European 
Empires, together with a successful break-away in the form of the United States of America, 
enjoyed a condition of global political and economic hegemony which gave every appear-
ance of being wholly unchallengeable. Nevertheless there were soon to be straws in the 
wind: in 1906, the Japanese navy sank the Russian Fleet as it tried to make its presence felt 
in Vladivostok. Much more was to come: during the course of the 20th Century, all of 
Europe’s formal empires collapsed, and now lie in the dustbin of history. 
Nevertheless this did not have an immediate impact on the distribution of wealth: during the 
course of the 20th Century, those fortunate enough to be resident in the Euro-American 
‘North’ achieved a position of unprecedented prosperity. Meanwhile the experience of most 
of those in the South was the inverse: an absolute – let alone a relative – decline in their liv-
ing standards. But as the 21st century opens, the cracks in that pattern have also become 
increasingly manifest. Japan, and now China and India, are becoming increasingly prosper-
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ous: there is clearly no holding them back. Meanwhile as Donald Rumsfeld’s statement im-
plicitly acknowledges, the United States has encountered the limits of military hegemony: 
hence his emphasis on the critical role of non-military initiatives in the defence of US inter-
ests – or in other words of its position as global hegemon.  
Can the United States – and beyond that the North in general – hope to achieve that goal? 
As innumerable critics have noted, the North has only been able to reach and sustain its cur-
rent position of global privilege by carefully managing processes of globalisation to ensure 
that they operate to their own advantage. Hence whilst obstacles to the global circulation of 
both goods and capital by now largely disappeared, the global market in labour – or to put it 
more specifically, in non-professional labour – has remained subject to tight spatial con-
straints. Hence whilst those who those who organise and manipulate the trade in goods and 
capital fill the expensive seats in the front of world’s international airliners, leaving those in 
the rear to be filled by customers of the booming (Northern) tourist trade, thereby allowing 
those who conceive of themselves as ‘global citizens’ to circulate freely through the world’s 
airports, those based in the impoverished South enjoy no such liberty. Only Northern pass-
ports facilitate travel, and ensure that their holders will be waved through immigration control. 
Southern passports are careful scrutinised at every international border, and the absence of 
the necessary visas – which can only be obtained by the privileged and well-connected – 
serve as instruments of exclusion.  
By so doing the North has managed to restructure the global economy without significantly 
endangering its inhabitant’s position of relative privilege. Given strict controls on the transna-
tional movement of labour, the North has succeeded in relocating vast swathes of the manu-
facturing activity from which it had previously drawn its prosperity to low-wage regions in the 
South and East, so enabling its increasingly prosperous inhabitants to enjoy the benefits of a 
huge array of cheaply manufactured consumer goods imported from elsewhere. Yet however 
comfortable this outcome may be to its beneficiaries, it is by no means clear as how stable 
these outsourcing strategies will be. As an immediate outcome of these developments, the 
world’s most prosperous nation now finds itself mired in wholly unprecedented levels of both 
internal and external debt, just as it is trying – and failing – to fulfil the role of global police-
man. It could well be that the resultant house of cards is close to nemesis.  
However it is not the financial contradictions arising from current global trade imbalances on 
which this chapter focuses, but rather a parallel – but equally serious – set of contradictions: 
those which are emerging around efforts to constrain the global circulation of labour, given 
that for the past half century the wealthy North is has begun to experience serious shortages 
in that equally vital commodity.  
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Global labour markets 
That the most recent phase of globalisation should have been accompanied by the introduc-
tion of ever tighter constraints on the circulation of labour should come as no surprise. As the 
disjunction between Northern and Southern standards of living grew steadily wider as the 
cost of long long-distance travel steadily fell, the attraction of taking a migratory jump into 
Northern labour markets became increasingly attractive to Southerners with the know-how 
and the assets needed to get there. At first their arrival went largely unnoticed. But as the 
scale of their presence grew, indigenous Northerners soon began to fear that the competitive 
presence of Southerners would undermine their bargaining position in the local labour mar-
ket, leading to the introduction of immigration controls. These rapidly became a focus of in-
tense conflict, since Southern migrants had ever interest in penetrating those barriers, the 
better to reinforce their capacity to make the most of the opportunities for advancement avai-
lable on the far side of these exclusionary disjunctions.  
Although the barriers of exclusion have consequently been endlessly reinforced, their effec-
tive defence has proved to be exceedingly problematic, not least because processes of glob-
alisation simultaneously insist that they should remain porous to an even larger volume of 
legitimate traffic, including businessmen, skilled professionals and tourists – as well as to 
numerous Southerners who have gained the right to cross them. Hence contemporary inter-
national borders are much more akin to sieves than brick walls. Their principal function is to 
protect the integrity of the socio-economic and demographic integrity of the population which 
lies behind them by filtering out unacceptable and illegitimate entrants. But as immigration 
control, together with the suppression of terrorism, has leapt to the top of the political agenda 
throughout the North, the construction of sieves which will successfully fulfil these contradic-
tory demands is proving to be intensely problematic.  
There are two main reasons for this. In the firstly place the discriminatory objectives of this 
sieving process stand in sharp contradiction to the universalist and egalitarian principles in 
which the Northerners social, political, legal and judicial institutions are nominally founded. 
Most jurisdictions have consequently embarked on all manner of work-arounds in their efforts 
to square the circle. Secondly, and more pragmatically, the excluders have found that they 
are already on a hiding to nothing. If their borders have already been breached by an earlier 
inflow of settlers, and if those settlers are in a position to support and encourage their kins-
folk in their efforts to join them, knowing that there are plentiful opportunities for employment 
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in the local labour market, it follows that all efforts to hold back the inflow are likely to be as 
ineffective as King Canute’s efforts to hold back the rising tide. In other words no matter how 
successfully Northerners have hitherto been able to bend processes of globalisation to their 
advantage, in this sphere, as in so many others, nemesis appears to be far closer at hand 
than they are prepared to acknowledge. Despite the immense scale of the organisational, 
ideological and material resources which are currently being mobilised in efforts to defend 
the position of global hegemony which they currently enjoy, both the scale and the effective-
ness of the transgressive Southern counter-attacks is becoming steadily greater, as Donald 
Rumsfeld plainly acknowledged. With such considerations this paper is best read as a report 
on current developments on key global battlefront.  
 
Antecedents: migration and industrial development 
The North’s current strategies of privilege-maintenance would have been far easier to man-
age if it had always had access to adequate supplies of labour – and most especially of un-
skilled manual labour – within its own spatial boundaries. However as its indigenous inhabi-
tants grew steadily more prosperous during the course of the twentieth century onwards, it 
has become increasingly difficult to persuade anyone to fill the hard, heavy and generally 
unattractive – but nevertheless organisationally vital – jobs in what can conveniently be sum-
med up as the servile sector of the labour market. Since many of those jobs were in the lo-
wer reaches of the manufacturing sector, one might have expected that the progressive ex-
port of the manufacturing sector to low-wage countries in the South would have resolved that 
problem, but that was not to be. As Northern economies continued with their onward march 
into prosperity, there has been a positive explosion in the demand for extra hands to process 
agricultural products, to operate the hotel and catering sector, and to provide personal care 
for the elderly, sick and otherwise disabled. In the midst of ever-growing prosperity, finding 
hands willing to undertake the dirty work has become increasingly difficult. These are tasks 
which the indigenes are unwilling to undertake at any price. In these circumstances only one 
solution was available: to import additional hands which were prepared to undertake such 
tasks. As prosperity has steadily spread throughout the North, it soon became clear that the-
re was only one viable source of the necessary supplies of additional labour power: the rela-
tively impoverished South.  
However neither the demand for labour to carry out such menial and servile tasks, nor the 
arrival of migrants to fill them developed overnight. Current outcomes are consequently the 
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result of historical processes, such that neither the character of those outcomes, nor the con-
tradictions which have accompanied their emergence can, nor indeed their likely course of 
future development can be properly appreciated in the absence of an understanding of the 
dynamic which generated them, Once viewed in processual terms, it becomes self-evident 
that current outcomes were in no sense consciously planned: rather they are better under-
stood as the result of a whole series of ad hoc, but invariably creative, responses to immedi-
ate contingencies. 
 
The beginnings of globalisation from below 
Having set up colonies in the ‘new worlds’ which they had discovered, the Northern globalis-
ers who followed in Columbus’ wake promptly began to look for hands to perform the hardest 
and most challenging tasks in tropical plantation agriculture; and if members of the indige-
nous population failed to live up to the task, an obvious answer was at hand: the importation 
of forced labour from elsewhere – either as slaves, or when that went out of fashion, as in-
dentured servants. Millions of people were turned into involuntary transnational migrants on 
this basis. However the switch from sail to steam several centuries later heralded a new de-
velopment in the global labour market. Technological progress opened up a new category of 
waged employment: transnationally oriented tasks which Northerner workers were not pre-
pared to fulfil – in this case stokers in coal-fired steamships, especially those sailing in tropi-
cal waters. Recruitment of local workers prepared to undertake these tasks was soon under-
way in Shanghai, Calcutta, Bombay, Aden and Lagos – and before too long clusters of ex-
seamen of such origins could be found eking out living in small clusters near the dockside in 
all the major seaports of the North.  
However late nineteen and early twentieth centuries exclusionary measure to prevent further 
settlement were largely unnecessary. Except in areas such as Canada, California and Aus-
tralia where Asian migrants of peasant origins began to compete with their Northern counter-
parts for access to land on Agricultural frontier, formal efforts to exclude such competitive 
pressures were largely unnecessary. When labour ran short in the metropolitan cities, as 
routinely occurred during each successive economic boom, the vacant slots could readily be 
filled by migrants of Irish, and Eastern- and Southern-European origin. Given their routinely 
exclusion from the formal labour market, ex-seamen of Southern origin had no alternative but 
to rely on the informal sector – most usually as pedlars, fortune tellers and so forth – as a 
source of income. Whilst many achieved a moderate degree of success on this basis, until 
the advent of the Second World War, the profits from such activities were rarely sufficiently 
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large to persuade further settlers to follow in their footsteps. Nevertheless these early pio-
neers were to play a key role in the dramatic developments which followed the close of hos-
tilities. 
Wartime opened many niches in the labour market from which the pioneers had hitherto 
been excluded. As a result of mass mobilisation, acute labour shortages rapidly emerged in 
manufacturing industry. Race, like gender, ceased to be a bar to industrial employment. And 
although voluntary migration ceased during wartime, the settlers’ numbers were steadily 
augmented by stokers rescued after the ships in which they served had been sunk by torpe-
does or mines. For the hitherto excluded, wartime was consequently a period of considerably 
prosperity. Besides opening up opportunities for industrial employment, many pioneers fur-
ther augmented their incomes by selling black-market nylons imported by their fellow-
countrymen still serving on trans-Atlantic convoys. However this window of opportunity did 
not remain open for long. When demobilisation took place after the close of hostilities, racial 
exclusion set in with a vengeance once again.  
In these circumstances many of the most successful pioneers returned home with their ac-
cumulated savings as soon as normal transport links were re-established; most of the less 
successful stayed on, and took the opportunity to expand the door-to-door peddling circuits 
which had been established in response to war-time exigencies. Hence when the post-war 
boom took off in the late 1940s, precipitating labour shortages which could no longer be filled 
by migrants from Eastern Europe, they were well-placed to move back into industrial em-
ployment as and when it became available, as well as to pass back news of the burgeoning 
range of opportunities to their kinsfolk folk back home. Hence each of the early pioneers was 
able to act as the catalyst for a cascading process of chain migration, in which new set of 
arrivals set about sponsoring the migration of further kinsfolk as soon as they had gained a 
position of reasonable security at their destination. Similar processes were also occurring 
across the length and breadth Euro-America.  
It follows that virtually all the non-European ethnic colonies which are now a salient feature of 
the Euro-American urban-industrial landscape have a much longer history than is commonly 
realised. Besides owing their origin to the unpredictable contingencies to which led the early 
pioneers to wash up where and when they did, they owe their growth to steadily escalating 
self-recruiting processes of chain migration. The whole exercise was also strongly entrepre-
neurial in character. Migrants were not recruited by their employers. Instead the vast majority 
made their own way to their destinations, most usually with the active assistance of their pre-
decessors. As a result these self-constructed migratory escalators delivered millions settlers 
from very specific localities in the rural South to equally specific destinations in the Metropoli-
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tan north, and in doing so actively facilitating the growth of tight-knit ethnic colonies at all 
their multitudinous points of arrival (Ballard 2003a). 
It follows that the Southern migrant presence in the Northern labour market was not the out-
come of any kind of planned and formally implemented recruitment program on the part of 
either employers or state. Rather the process was much more akin to that whereby Europe-
ans re-peopled the so-called New World: settlers were self-selected and self-recruited entre-
preneurs seeking a better future for themselves and their families. Many were drawn from the 
former Imperial possesses of the countries in which they chose to settle, and hence had little 
difficulty in acquiring local citizenship – at least at the outset. Meanwhile those who estab-
lished themselves elsewhere, or in countries such as Germany which had long been stripped 
of their Empires found themselves accorded much more limited civil rights, as in the case of 
Germany’s gastarbeiter in Germany. But although many other European states are currently 
seeking to follow the German example, dual status apartheid-style regimes are proving hard 
to sustain, not least because they run wholly contrary to the principles enshrined in the Euro-
pean Convention of Human Rights. Hence the majority of settled migrants, and especially 
their offspring, have by now become de facto citizens. In this respect they are substantially 
better off than the even larger number of migrants whose transnational escalators have been 
confined to the South. Although processes of globalisation have recently begun to generate 
equally large demands for unskilled labour in oil-rich areas in the Middle East, and rapidly 
industrialising countries such as Malaysia, South/South migrants have nothing akin to the 
ECHR as a fulcrum around which to assert their rights. Hence the position of most such 
transnational migrants is much more akin to those of indentured labourers than that of their 
more fortunate counterparts who were fortunate enough to have washed up in destinations 
further North (Ballard 1988).  
 
Chain migration and the dynamics of South/North escalators 
Long-distance migratory flows have long attracted the attention of economists and geogra-
phers. In keeping with their disciplinary predilections, their push/pull models of migration are 
grounded in a taken-for-granted assumption that those swept up in migratory flows have 
done so on a basis unstructured by anything other than their individualistic interests and pri-
orities. As we have seen this assumption is as misguided as it is misleading. A key feature of 
contemporary mass migratory flows is that only a tiny minority of those involved were indi-
vidualistic pioneers who set off along a hitherto unknown route to an equally unknown desti-
nation. Whilst chain migration cannot develop in the absence of such catalyst, once such a 
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pioneer has carved out a niche for himself and established its viability, all his many succes-
sors proceed on a very different basis: they know precisely where they are going, and as the 
flow increases, each successive wave of migrants moves down an increasingly well worn 
paths. Hence the volume of migrants passing along any given channel, together with the 
capacity of those involved to take evasive action in the face of migration managers’ efforts to 
limit the scale of the inflow, is governed by a further dynamic over and above the push/pull 
variables on which economists routinely focus. Given that such escalators are grounded in 
an active dynamic of mutual assistance, these self-generated, entrepreneurial and hence 
structurally transgressive escalators do much more than providing those in a position to step 
aboard to remove themselves from conditions of relative deprivation at their starting point to 
lush pastures of prosperity at their destination. They are also corporately structured transna-
tional networks – albeit constituted on an informal basis – which are no less adept in circulat-
ing assets, ideas and personnel on a global basis, regardless of national boundaries, than 
are more formally constituted transnational enterprises operating ‘from above’. .  
Whether emanating from above or below, there are many parallels between the operations of 
such networks. There are many further parallels between the ways in which these networks 
operate, not least because the efficiency with which institutional structures serve their pur-
poses is critically dependent on the sophistication of the strategies developed by those in-
volved to help themselves. Several factors are critical in the process of so doing, of which 
information-transfer is one of the most crucial: the greater the speed and efficiency with 
which information about the global distribution of potential entrepreneurial niches, the capital 
required to cover both the cost of passage and of opening up those niches, and about the 
location of obstacles along the way, as well as the strategies best suited to evading them, is 
critical to the success of the whole operation. However at least on the face of things there is 
one massive difference between contemporary initiatives operating from above, and those 
operating from below: whilst the former have access to massive capital assets, the latter 
have – or at least began with – next to nothing. But as in all other entrepreneurial activities, 
migration also requires an initial capital investment to cover the cost passports, fares and in 
contemporary contexts, the evasion of border controls. With this in mind it is worth noting that 
the most successful escalators have been self-financing, in the sense that potential migrants’ 
predecessors routinely prepared to provide the finance required to enable their kinsfolk to 
join them, and to enable them to find their feet once they have arrived at their destination. In 
other words the speed and efficiency with migratory escalators operate is directly propor-
tional to the strength of the relationships of mutual reciprocity sustained within and articulated 
through transnational networks of which support them.  
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Nor did these networks of mutual support fall into abeyance once such migrants had reached 
their destination. Rather they played an equally significant role in facilitating the emergence 
of thriving ethnic colonies within which settlers once again made the most of their ancestral 
cultural capital – and most especially those entrenched within the networks of kinship recip-
rocity – to make the most of every available opportunity, whether within the specific local 
niche into which the escalator had delivered them, or yet further niches which members of 
the colony had begun to identify. But whilst the entrepreneurial character of these transna-
tional networks set them on a path of continual spatial and economic expansion, links with 
the home base were rarely, if ever forgotten. Hence in addition to providing numerous kins-
folk to join the migratory escalator, all of which was eventually repaid, the majority of settlers 
also remitted substantial proportion of their savings in order to extend and rebuild their family 
home, to celebrate their childrens’ marriages in style, and to invest in land and agricultural 
equipment. Such ever-burgeoning transnational networks have consequently served innu-
merable purposes besides facilitating further migration: as vehicles which actively facilitate 
the circulation of ideas, capital and persons within a global arena, they have also become 
powerful engines for economic development for members of the transnational communities 
they serve, and in doing so routinely deliver huge volumes of investment capital into each of 
the multitude of invariably tightly localised areas from which they originally emerged (Ballard 
2003b).  
 
Global transgressors: transnational networks ‘from below’ 
By contrast with the European predecessors, contemporary migrant entrepreneurs operate 
‘from below’, rather than ‘from above’ (Smith and Guarnitzo 1998). Theirs is not an initiative 
which is part and parcel of a process of Imperial expansion, but rather of its antithesis: the 
outcome of efforts by those who were disadvantaged by those processes to break their way 
transgressively into the bastions of privilege to which Imperialism gave rise. Hence whilst 
outflow European migrants into the ‘New World’ during the eighteenth and nineteenth centu-
ries unrestricted, given that it went with the grain of then largely uncontested processes of 
globalisation from above, the challenges to privilege let loose by their contemporary succes-
sors’ countervailing strategies of ‘globalisation from below’ have been countered by increas-
ingly fierce opposition. In the face of the transgressive challenges to the established order 
presented by Southern migrants’ entrepreneurial initiatives ‘from below’, the North has re-
sponded with increasingly sophisticated strategies with which to hold such challenges at bay. 
Ever tighter immigration control has become a central plank of that strategy.  
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Nevertheless those seeking to curtail and control the activities of those engaged in such 
transnational initiatives from below regularly find themselves perplexed by what they encoun-
ter. Although no less skilled in transcending national boundaries to their own advantage than 
their formally constituted counterparts operating hegemonically ‘from above’, those operating 
‘from below’ typically relied on informally constituted networks of inter-personal reciprocity as 
a means of ordering their transactions, in sharp contrast to the formal bureaucratic proce-
dures typically deployed by transnational corporations operating from above. But although 
their alterity in this sense is undoubtedly an invaluable source of competitive advantage, it 
also precipitates a great deal of confusion – and equally deep-seated reactions of suspicion 
amongst those seeking to manage global processes from above.  
Indeed as the contents Donald Rumsfeld’s strategic vision for the future serves to empha-
sise, in recent years the transgressive efforts of those emerging from below to transform the 
global socio-economic order, and the challenges consequently posed to Northern efforts to 
sustain its established position of privilege have begun to render the contradictions between 
the two ever more acute. As a result a new battlefield has unexpected emerged: the rule of 
law. With the turn of the millennium the powers have begun to make ever more intensive 
efforts to contain the looming challenge from below is by harnessing the resources of na-
tional and international law as a means of de-legitimating, and indeed of criminalising all as-
pects of the transgressive initiatives currently being mounted from below. In doing so the 
informal components of those initiatives – which are so often a key to their transgressive 
success – are proving to be an extremely attractive target for legalistic, and hence legiti-
mated, intervention.  
 
9/11 and its consequences 
From this perspective the events of 9/11 were a godsend to those seeking to implement the 
resultant strategies of containment. They paved the way for the passage of USA Patriot Act, 
whose draconian implications run onwards to this day. In the absence of any serious degree 
of scrutiny or discussion, Congress voted the Act – whose full title reads Uniting and 
Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct 
Terrorism –into law less than six weeks after the collapse of the twin towers. Identifying its 
purposes as being “to deter and punish terrorist acts in the United States and around the 
world,” the Act runs to no less than 342 pages, and its implications are quite extraordinary.  
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The Act contains three substantive sections. Title II (Enhanced Surveillance Procedures pp. 
13-60) is internally focussed. It provides the Federal authorities with wholly unprecedented 
rights to delve into the personal affairs of US citizens, and attracted vigorous criticism on the 
grounds that it severely undermines their civil liberties. By contrast Title III (International Mo-
ney Laundering and Anti-Terrorist Financing pp. 60 - 185, and IV (Protecting the Border 
pp.185 - 242) are globally oriented. Taking advantage of the fact that the US dollar has be-
come the global medium of exchange, and that every bank of any significance operating a-
nywhere in the world consequently runs a correspondent account with one or other of major 
banks on Wall Street, Title III sets out AML-CFT regulations with which every financial opera-
tion in the world must conform if it wishes to participate in the dollar-denominated global fi-
nancial system. Meanwhile Chapter IV sets out procedures which impose much stricter con-
trols on those seeking to cross the borders of the USA, and of a kind which have also been 
promptly emulated throughout the North. In other words the ‘terrorism’ which the Act seeks to 
target includes all forms of transnationally transgressive challenges ‘from below’ to which the 
US has begun to find itself subjected.  
Although presented as a single free-standing measure to counter the challenge of 9/11, there 
is no way in which the complex measures set out in the Act could have been prepared in the 
short interval between the collapse of the twin towers and its passage through Congress. 
Rather regulatory enthusiasts within the administration took advantage of the chauvinistic 
post 9/11 uproar to fold a whole series of ready-made measures at which Congress might 
otherwise have balked into the new measure, which was promptly enacted as law with little 
or no discussion or scrutiny. What is now quite clear, however, is that the regulatory initia-
tives set in train went far beyond the Act’s announced purpose of providing the administration 
with the tools required to close down Al-Qaeda. Rather it provided the North with a whole 
arsenal of weapons with which to bear down on the everyday operation of all manner other 
transnational initiatives which had, like Al-Qaeda, emerged transgressively from below. Mo-
reover in keeping with the logic of Rumsfeld’s subsequent strategy statement, it provided a 
means whereby the authorities could set about pursuing these objectives on a legal, rather 
than a military basis. Having identified informally constituted networks as conspiratorial, and 
hence potentially either criminal or terroristic in character, the rest was easy: not only could 
all those engaged informal networking be threatened with criminal prosecution, but the global 
hegemon had placed itself in a position from which it could dangle an alternative and more 
acceptable remedy in front of such challengers. All they had to do to render their behaviour 
acceptable was to ‘modernise’ and hence de-criminalise their practices by re-routing them 
through the legitimate procedures of the formal sector. But however sensible – and indeed 
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innocuous – such exhortations may seem, they carry a large and quite deliberate sting in the 
tail. Hence their logic and consequences deserve our closest attention.  
 
Migration and economic development 
If the ever more successful entrepreneurial activities of migrant workers are regarded as of-
fering a steadily more alarming threat to the interests of the prosperous North, the reverse is 
the case from a Southern perspective. This was made clear in Dilip Ratha’s unambiguously 
titled contribution to the 2003 issue of the World Bank’s Report on Global Development Fi-
nance,1 in which he argued that 
As private capital flows have declined, workers’ remittances have become an increas-
ingly prominent source of external funding for many developing countries. This chap-
ter’s … main messages are: 
• Remittance flows are the second-largest source, behind FDI, of external funding 
for developing countries. In 2001, workers’ remittance receipts of developing 
countries stood at $72.3 billion, much higher than total official flows 
• Remittances to low-income countries were larger as a share of GDP and imports 
than were those to middle income countries. Remittances are also more stable 
than private capital flows, which often move pro-cyclically, thus raising incomes 
during booms and depressing them during downturns. By contrast, remittances 
are less volatile – and may even rise – in response to economic cycles in the re-
cipient country. They are expected to rise significantly in the long term. 
• Remittances are often invested by the recipients, particularly in countries with 
sound economic policies. Improvements in policies and relaxation of foreign ex-
change controls in the 1990s may have encouraged the use of remittances for in-
vestment.  
• By strengthening financial-sector infrastructure and facilitating international travel, 
countries could increase remittance flows, thereby bringing more funds into formal 
channels. The transaction costs of fund transfers often exceed 20 percent; reduc-
ing them by even 5 percentage points could generate annual savings of $3.5 bil-
lion for workers sending money home.  
• Facilitating international labour mobility is an even more crucial—and controver-
sial—means of increasing remittance flows to developing countries. Greater inter-
national migration could generate substantial benefits to the world economy.  
• Developed countries remain wary of relaxing immigration policies, however, as it 
is feared that immigration would increase competition in local job markets and po-
se a fiscal burden on local tax payers. Developed countries also fear that large 
scale immigration may erode cultural values and undermine national security.  
                                               
1 Ratha, D. “Workers’ Remittances: An Important and Stable Source of External Development Finance” 
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• Developing countries worry about a “brain drain” even though any output losses 
from emigration of skilled workers may be more than offset by remittances and 
positive network effects on trade and investment. 
Despite the cautionary notes which Ratha sounds in his final two points, the overall tone of 
his contribution is distinctly bullish. But if the Bank had actively followed through the implica-
tions of the arguments he was making, it would in effect have put the institution on a collision 
course with respect a set of issues of intense concern to its principal sponsor. How, then, 
were the contradictions to be resolved?  
The issues which Ratha had raised could not be ignored. Hence the 2006 issue of the report2 
was entirely devoted to the analysis of issues which had only merited a single unprecedented 
chapter three years before. Further analysis conducted the Bank’s econometricians cast no 
doubt whatsoever on the scale of the global financial transfers highlighted by Ratha. Al-
though acknowledging that the figures with which they were working were far from complete, 
by 2006 the Bank’s statisticians had raised Ratha’s original estimate of the scale of value 
flow in 2001 from to $72.3 billion to $96.5 billion, and gone on to put the total scale of identi-
fiable transfers in 2005 at $166.9 billion. Moreover those estimates were based solely on 
reports supplied to Washington by the Central Banks responsible for each national currency, 
all of which not only used differing (and often inadequate) criteria to identify such transfers; 
moreover they were only in a position to identify transfers through formal channels. In what 
can only be described as a massive understatement, the 2006 report noted that “Whilst it is 
extremely difficult to estimate the flows through informal channels, they appear to be large.”  
However a further striking feature of the report is that despite the huge degree of uncertainly 
about the data available to them, the Bank’s econometricians were not inhibited in sieving 
the figures with which they had been supplied through whole series of macro-economic cost-
benefit analyses. The result of their efforts was entirely predictable. Whilst Ratha’s clear-cut 
conclusions about the boost to economic development which migrant remittances could be 
expected to precipitate could not be ruled out of court, they were nevertheless surrounded by 
– and hence buried – under all manner of caveats, counter-interpretations and qualifications. 
One striking new theme did emerge from the report however: the arguments set out in the 
final chapter, headed Reducing Remittance Fees. It begins by specifying the underlying 
problem with some clarity:  
                                               
2 Global Economic Prospects 2006: Economic Implications of Remittances and Migration Washington, DC: World 
Bank 
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Cost is usually not an issue in large remittances (made for the purpose of trade, in-
vestment, or aid), because, as a percentage of the principal amount, it tends to be 
small. But for small, personal transfers, remittance costs are high – unnecessarily so. 
Providers of remittance services in the formal sector typically charge a fee of 10–15 
percent of the principal amount to handle the small remittances typically made by poor 
migrants. High fees place a financial burden on the migrant remitters and on the re-
cipients of the remittances, who receive a smaller amount of the much-needed funds 
sent by their family members. 
and then goes on to explain that 
The remittance industry consists of formal and informal fund transfer agents. Major 
competitors include a few large global players, such as the major money transfer op-
erators (MTOs) and banks, as well as hundreds of smaller participants that serve 
niche markets in specific geographic remittance corridors. The informal fund transfer 
agents include friends, family, and unregistered MTOs such as hawala dealers and 
trading companies…. Major MTOs such as Western Union and MoneyGram appar-
ently charge higher remittance fees than banks and other financial institutions that of-
fer remittance services to attract migrant customers (table 6.1). Informal channels 
such as hawala are reported to be cheaper than formal services. 
On this basis the theme on which the report moves almost entirely away from an examination 
of the development potential of migrant remittances, and instead re-focuses the discussion 
on what it identifies as the urgent need to reduce the high costs transmission costs with 
which migrants are faced when they set about remitting their savings back home:  
Reducing remittance fees would increase the disposable income of remitters, encour-
aging them to remit more. It also might encourage smaller and more frequent remit-
tances. Lower prices in a particular channel might encourage remitters to shift from 
other channels – notably informal ones.  
As ever, the 2006 report was beautifully presented and apparently closely reasoned. Never-
theless a close examination of the arguments it sets forth soon reveals that it is riddled with 
contradictions. Is there really such uncertainty of the benefits – no less at a micro- than a 
macro-economic level – of string-free capital transfers which greatly exceed aid transfers not 
just to some of the poorest countries in the world, but whose delivery is also heavily skewed 
to the poorer, if not the very poorest, sections of their population? And although reducing the 
transmission costs of such remittances is undoubtedly a worthy aim, is it really so much of a 
problem as the report suggest? Or had the agenda of the Patriot Act wormed its way into the 
upper reaches of the Bank, given that Donald Rumsfeld’s former deputy had by then become 
its Chairman? With this in mind the Bank’s change of focus towards reducing transmission 
costs gains even greater significance, given that in most sectors migrants had already de-
vised highly effective solutions to that problem by making use of their transnational networks 
to develop Informal Value Transmission Systems of their own, thereby enabling to circum-
vent the high fees routinely charged by transfer agencies such as Western Union. Indeed as 
the 2006 report noted “Informal channels such as hawala are reported to be cheaper than 
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formal services.” They are indeed, and by a large margin: but unfortunately IVTS/Hawala 
networks were one of the principal targets of the Patriot Act. As a result the World Bank – 
and subsequently DFID – were swiftly herded into efforts to suppress transnational initiatives 
from below in favour of the services of ‘safer’ and ‘more reliable’, but much more expensive 
institutional initiatives from above.  
 
Migrant self-help: Transnational networks and coalitions of reciprocity 
Anyone who has had first hand-contact with migrant workers will be well aware that if trans-
mitting a substantial portion of their savings to their kinsfolk back home is one of their most 
urgent priorities, then finding a means of transmission through which their savings can be 
sent swiftly, reliably and above all cheaply to an often-remote destination is the other; and 
precisely because the vast majority will have arrived at their destination along self-
constructed networks of mutual reciprocity, it makes immediate sense to make use of those 
self-same facilities to send the fruits of labours in the reverse direction. 
Virtually all contemporary migrant communities have developed IVTS networks as a means 
of so doing. Those developed by South Asian migrants have built on the resources of the 
Hawala systems which have been in use since ancient times as a means of facilitating trade 
in the Indian Ocean region, and I eventually took the opportunity to set out detailed analysis 
of how they currently operate in a lengthy article in The Journal of Banking Regulation.3 Tak-
ing up precisely the issues which the World Bank report signally fails to address, I argue that 
Hawala-style IVTS networks devised some highly effective strategies for dealing with the 
logistical challenges faced by all those seeking to deliver migrant remittances in the contem-
porary world. The challenge is immense, and in many respects a banker’s nightmare. Innu-
merable customers, often without bank accounts of their own, wanting to send penny-
packets of value re-denominated in obscure currencies to remote destinations swiftly and 
cheaply – and at low cost. The last requirement is the killer: given the formal sector’s cum-
bersome bureaucratic procedures, there is no way in which such services can be provided at 
                                               
3
 Ballard (2005) “Coalitions of Reciprocity and the Maintenance of Financial Integrity within Informal Value Trans-
mission Systems: the operational dynamics of contemporary hawala networks” Journal of Banking Regulation 6, 
4, pp. 319 – 352.<www.art.man.ac.uk/CASAS/pdfpapers/coaltions.pdf > A more concise analysis of the issues 
can be found in “Hawala: criminal haven or vital financial network?” Newsletter of the International Institute for 
Asian Studies, (September 2006 issue) pp. 8 - 9 < www.art.man.ac.uk/casas/pdfpapers/IIAShawala.pdf > 
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low cost. By contrast IVTS networks have found a way of cracking the underlying logistical 
challenge. By making the most of local know-how, and by replacing cumbersome bureau-
cratic procedures with relationships of personal trust whenever and wherever possible, they 
are in a position to cut such overhead cost dramatically, and hence provide far more effective 
value transmission systems than their formally constituted competitors.  
But although ‘informal’ in that they routinely replace bureaucratic relationships with those of 
personal trust, these operations are no sense either small-scale or unsophisticated. Indeed 
the secret of the contemporary success lies in their extensive use of the latest developments 
in communications technology, from the internet to satellite phones, as vehicles for the 
transmission of financial data on a global scale. Precisely because they have been able to 
combine a dramatic reduction of clerical activity through the routine use of self-constructed 
coalitions of reciprocity with the benefits of the latest developments in IT as a means of facili-
tating instant and accurate data-transmission, they have been able to build on the resources 
of ancient value-transmission systems to make the most of a rapidly growing niche in the 
global market place for transnational financial services.  
From this perspective I would argue that Hawala networks – together with their equivalents 
generated in Chinese and Latin American contexts – are best understood as graphic exem-
plars of the more general phenomenon which this paper aims to highlight: the capacity of 
entrepreneurs ‘from below’ to build on the resources of their ancestral heritage, often in com-
bination with a mastery of the resources of modern technology, to devise strategies with to 
evade, puncture and in more general terms to subvert the institutional obstacles placed in 
their path by established institutions operating hegemonically ‘from above’. The conse-
quences of the deployment of these strategies of transgressive entrepreneurship are steadily 
widening. Besides enabling self-selected groups of Southerners to continue to evade the 
barriers of immigration control, and hence to establish an ever larger and more firmly rooted 
presence in the North, they are also using their ethnic colonies as springboards from which 
to advance on further trajectories of upward socio-economic mobility, despite all the obsta-
cles of exclusionism that they continue to encounter in Northern employment markets. To be 
sure the speed with which those involved are moving upward and outward varies both from 
context to context and from community to community. Nevertheless from a global perspec-
tive the redistributive impact of these developments is becoming steadily more spectacular.  
Long-distance migration ‘from below’ has become a steadily more salient feature of the con-
temporary social order, as innumerable escalators rooted deep in the rural South have estab-
lished beachheads in the worlds’ prosperous and rapidly expanding metropolitan centres. As 
millions of migrants have marched upwards and outwards through these self-constructed 
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translocal networks in search of better opportunities for themselves for their families, they 
have achieved varied degrees of success. Some have failed completely, others have been 
viciously exploited, but many more have achieved significant degrees of success: the deliv-
ery several hundred billion dollars per annum to their kinsfolk back home is no mean feat, 
since it very substantially surpasses the level value delivery made by all the world’s aid 
agencies put together. It is undoubtedly a development of global significance. But by the very 
same token these migrant initiatives have yet further destabilised the hitherto established 
structure of the global order, so much so that their achievements have precipitated an ever 
more ordered institutional backlash. Hence the North has begun to develop a carefully coor-
dinated set of defences in an effort to constrain this mounting transgressive threat.  
 
Countervailing initiatives to constrain the transgressors 
Most Northern governments – and most especially the electorates to whom they are democ-
ratically accountable – view the operation of the global economy in zero-sum terms. Hence 
despite their verbal commitment to fair trade and the eradication of global poverty, the initia-
tives launched by migrant entrepreneurs, now being followed up with yet greater vigour by 
their locally-born offspring, are routinely viewed as most unwelcome. But if electorates con-
sequently demand that counter-measures should be taken to contain the threat, making a 
successful response to these demands has proved to be extremely tricky. The authorities 
found themselves confronted with two serious sets of contradictions as they set out to do so. 
The first of these contradictions is the most straightforward: the why Southern migrants ar-
rived in the first place, and why they continue to arrive despite ever more draconian efforts to 
prevent them from doing so that there is a real and pressing demand for additional labour 
power in almost every Northern economy. Migration managers consequently find themselves 
caught between the need to provide an adequate supply of hands to perform the servile 
tasks at the bottom end of the labour market, and ever more vocal demands that entry of 
unwelcome aliens should be suppressed. Granting short-term labour permits seems at first 
sight to be an attractive solution to that problem, but as regime after regime has discovered, 
gastarbeiter invariably display a remarkable capacity to put down local roots. Furthermore 
Human Rights legislation makes it exceedingly difficult to bar such settlers from bringing wi-
ves and children to join them. Nevertheless an alternative solution has recently emerged: the 
extension of the borders of the regional labour market to include neighbouring regions popu-
lated by persons of greater social acceptability than true Southerners. This is precisely what 
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has been achieved by extending the borders of the EU into Eastern Europe. Nevertheless as 
new Europe becomes steadily more prosperous, the problem is likely to emerge on an even 
larger scale: it is deep-seated global inequalities between North and South which precipitates 
the propensity to migrate. Those pressures will not evaporate until the underlying patterns of 
inequality are remedied.  
The second source contradictions with which Northern societies are currently confronted are 
both more intractable, and yet more pressing. Thanks to their deeply rooted commitment to 
civilisation, the rule of law and the egalitarian application of principles of universal rights, let 
alone to the reduction of global poverty, all now face a profound dilemma: how can they find 
some means of implementing the necessarily discriminatory anti-transgressive counter-
measures required to keep Southern interlopers at bay without falling foul of the egalitarian 
ideological principles around which their own internal social order is constructed? If they are 
to remain governed by the rule of law – a position to which they are inescapably committed – 
it follows that all such counter-measures must be legally sustainable. Or to put it the other 
way round, if the transgressive activities of the Southerners are to be held at bay, their efforts 
to up-end the global social order must be subjected to systematic criminalisation. That is why 
the combined impact of 9/11 and the Patriot Act are of such significance in any discussion of 
the current state of globalisation. Whilst the atrocities of 9/11 – reinforced by those of 3/11 
and 7/7 – provided the justification for setting legalistic considerations of equality to one side, 
the measures set out in the Patriot Act set out templates around which to construct measures 
to criminalise transgressive initiatives from below. Title IV provided a means of doing so with 
respect to illegitimate border-crossers (Inda 2005), whilst Title III went very much further. It 
provided a template which rendered all efforts to transfer funds across international borders 
on a basis which the global financial authorities identified as unacceptable equally illegiti-
mate, and hence subject to criminal sanctions. This is not to suggest that the Patriot Act initi-
ated this process of criminalisation: numerous steps had already been taken in this direction, 
no less in Europe than in the USA. Rather the Act’s significance lay in the scale, and above 
all the global extent to which it set out to advance this process through the construction of 
battery regulatory measures which rendered all manner of unwelcome transnational initia-
tives from below vulnerable to criminal sanctions 
.  
Moneylaundering 
The term ‘Money Laundering’ makes a usefully dramatic headline, and readily denotes the 
presence of serious criminal malfeasance. In essence the term refers to wide variety of differ-
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ing forms of financial engineering, all of which have a common objective: to protect financial 
value from unwelcome inspection by all forms of external authority. In the contemporary 
world by far the largest category of transactions of this kind – both in terms of their number, 
and the sheer volume of funds involved – are those which are fed through the global financial 
system in such a way that their original provenance is systematically obscured prior to their 
arrival in financial jurisdictions where deposits will be subjected to the minimum degree of 
regulatory scrutiny as to the identity of their beneficial owners, and subjected to zero levels of 
taxation. The bodies most heavily involved in such activities are transnational corporations, 
whose capacity to incur losses in locations where taxation and other forms or financial con-
straint are high, and to generate profits in offshore locations where both are non-existent, can 
only be described as spectacular; following hard in their heels are so-called ‘high net-worth’ 
individuals, who access the same set of high-powered lawyers and offshore banks to pro-
duce precisely the same results.4 It is also worth noting that the significant minority of these 
high net-worth individuals are of Southern rather than Northern provenance, and have gained 
access to enormous volumes of wealth during their kleptocratic occupation of public office in 
resource-rich states such as the Congo, the Philippines and Indonesia. Moreover as Baker 
elegantly demonstrates, the assets which have been tucked away on this basis are not only 
the ultimate spoils of contemporary processes of globalisation from above, but a major 
source of profits, and indeed the foundation of the asset base, of globally oriented financial 
services sector. Hence despite much huffing and puffing about the evils of money-
laundering, no significant steps have been taken to contain, to control or even to monitor 
assets flows of this kind. Given the scale of the vested interests at stake in this sphere, there 
seems little prospect of the interventions of the kind which Baker recommends being imple-
mented in the foreseeable future.  
One of the favoured strategies deployed by those seeking to defend these still-licit forms of 
financial engineering from serious regulatory control is to differentiate themselves from the 
‘real’ money launderers: those who deploy remarkably similar techniques to hide the source 
of their funds from the authorities, but do not to so much in the course of ‘innocent’ efforts to 
shield their legitimate income from taxation by grasping state agencies, but rather because 
the funds in question have been criminally acquired. Hence they argue that the term money-
laundering should properly be reserved for the activities of those engage in such activities 
                                               
4 The scale of these transactions (in trillions of dollars), as well as the manoeuvres which deployed in order pre-
cipitate their arrival at such destinations is discussed in detail and with great clarity in Baker (2005) Capitalism’s 
Achilles Heel: Dirty Money and How to Renew the Free Market System 
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selling smuggled consignments of Heroin and Cocaine, or alternatively financing illegitimate 
(i.e. terrorist) warfare – the AML/CFT agenda, in other words.  
Whilst it goes without saying that both drugs smuggling and the financing of terrorism are 
phenomena as real as they are alarming, their precise extent, as well as the scale of the fi-
nancial value transfers to which they give rise are by definition unknown. Moreover it is also 
worth remembering that since law-enforcement agencies are the principal source of esti-
mates of the scale of such flows, and since they also have every interest in hyping the num-
bers both to celebrate their relatively paltry successes and to provide them with the founda-
tions of demands for additional funding to enable them to do better, all the estimates of the 
scale of such transfer which they release with such enthusiasm to the public should be 
treated with some caution. Hence whatever the actual (but by definition unknown) scale of 
value transfers generated by such criminal activities may be, they are undoubtedly dwarfed 
into insignificance by the trillion dollar scale of more licit forms of money laundering which 
Baker explores. Moreover now that international observers are at long last beginning to ap-
preciate the scale of transnational value transfers generated by migrant remittances, there 
are excellent reasons to believe that the scale of such transfers, whilst still dramatically 
smaller than those generated by tax-evasion strategies, are nevertheless substantially larger 
than those generated by drug-smuggling.5  
Why, though, should we be talking about these three very different kinds of activity in the 
same breath? The answer should be obvious. If one of the most significant consequences of 
globalisation has been to erode the capacity of states control their own borders, that loss of 
control has now-where been more serious than with respect to the instrument which Marx 
properly recognised as the most corrosive human invention of all time: money. Put together 
with the way in which the internet has provided us with the capacity to engage in instant glo-
bal communication, money has also become global phenomenon. As result the capacity of 
localised states to control the flow of value across its borders has almost completely evapo-
rated. Although few dare say so out loud, the global financial system now stands wholly be-
yond any kind of local control – including that exercised by the Us Treasury and the New 
York Fed. In principle that should not matter. After all it is an article of faith that the benefits 
                                               
5 A commonplace mistake in calculating the scale of transnational money-laundering precipitated by drugs smug-
gling is to assume that the bulk of the street value of the drugs passes straight back into the hands of the smug-
glers themselves. This is clearly mistaken: the cut of those profits taken out by the many layers of the distribution 
networks is so substantial that only a small proportion of the retail price ends up in the hands of the wholesale 
smugglers. Moreover it is by no means clear that such smugglers would always seek to transfers such funds 
overseas in the process of laundering them.  
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of globalisation arise precisely because it facilitates the free flow of goods, capital, persons 
and ideas across parochial borders of all kinds. But as we have already seen, any regime 
which gave all persons an unlimited right to roam on a global basis would have severe con-
sequences for the current distribution of wealth and power. It is precisely in order to ensure 
that no such redistribution takes place that active steps have been taken to sure that the 
greater (and poorer) part of the global population are excluded from the exercise of such 
rights. With similar considerations in mind, efforts are currently being made to impose similar 
constraints on global flows of value – even though the implementation of this exercise is 
proving to be far trickier than those aimed at constraining the right to roam.  
On the face of it the Patriot Act said nothing about migrant remittances: rather it justified the 
battery of regulatory controls on transnational financial transfers on the grounds that they 
provided a necessary barrier against the prospect of further terrorist outrages. However the 
drawer from which the contents of Title III were swept up had initially been constructed to 
address another feature globalisation was a source of no less concern throughout the pros-
perous North: the ever escalating inflow of illegal narcotics from more tropical regions in the 
South, to which their borders were proving to be just as porous as they were to unauthorised 
immigration. Given that attempts to contain physical import of narcotics had proved to be just 
as unsuccessful as those aimed at eliminating their cultivation, those in charge of anti-
narcotics initiatives suggested than quite different strategy might prove more effective: if the 
financial sinews which underpinned these operations could be penetrated, the authorities 
would not only be in a better position to arrest the king-pins behind such operations, but in 
doing so bring all such operations to a swift halt.6 
By now it is quite clear that the ‘cut the financial sinews’ strategy has borne very little fruit – 
at least with respect to the purposes for which it was designed. Since its introduction the re-
tail price of both heroin and cocaine have continued to follow a steady downward trend, sug-
gesting that AML initiatives have not significantly constrained drug-smugglers’ ability to sup-
ply their market. Indeed falling prices suggest that suppliers have in fact been able to more 
than meet the ever rising level of demand for psychotropic substances in the Euro-American 
marketplace. But whilst the introduction of AML consequently appears to have had very little 
impact on the transnational transfer of psychotropic drugs, there can be no doubt whatsoever 
that the increasingly draconian regulatory framework rolled out in the aftermath of 9/11 has 
                                               
6
 David Rose Opium of the people The Observer, Sunday July 8 2001  
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had a far reaching impact on the activities of all those engaged in implementing transnational 
flows of value, no less in the formal than the informal sector. But whilst the formal sector has 
been able to ride the consequence of the tighter regulatory with relative ease, even if the cost 
of introducing additional bureaucratic procedures required to comply with regulatory provi-
sions has considerably increased their overheads, operations located in the informal sector 
have found themselves facing much great difficulties. Amongst the operations which have 
been hardest hit are the IVTS networks which have been constructed in an effort to avoid the 
excessive fees charges by financial institutions for the delivery of small packets of value to 
transnational destinations.  
With such issues in mind it is worth remembering that transnational value delivery is a highly 
specialist form of financial activity, and as such is largely peripheral to bread and butter bank-
ing operations in the domestic sector. Moreover given that transcurrency value deliveries 
necessarily involve arranging forex settlements, Banks much prefer to implement such trans-
actions on a substantial scale – as for example when they process business brought to them 
by major commercial enterprises. By contrast meeting the demands of migrant workers – the 
delivery of small packets of value in obscure currencies to even more obscure destinations 
on the far side of the globe – can only be described as a logistical nightmare. If they are able 
to provide for such customers at all – and they often conclude it is way beyond their interests 
and capabilities – the fees charged are invariably substantial.  
Beyond this lies a further issue. Most banks take the view that it is hardly worth their while to 
provide banking services to low net worth customers. The potential for profit is just too small. 
Hence although the proportion of the population holding personal bank accounts has risen 
steadily over the years, not least because the majority of mainstream employers now prefer 
to pay all their employees’ wages by electronic transfer rather than in cash, this does not 
work with respect to employees standing right at the bottom of the labour market. Many are 
still paid in cash, and in any event their incomes are too small and unreliable for them to gain 
straightforward access to banking facilities. Many recently arrived migrants find themselves 
in precisely this ‘unbanked’ position.  
It follows that if banks are disinterested – for straightforward commercial reasons – in provid-
ing banking services to such customers, they are even less interested in facilitating the deliv-
ery of penny-packets of value to obscure destinations in the South,. Hence even if they can 
be persuaded to offer such a service, they invariably charge a substantial commission: as 
much as 20% for a straightforward bank-to-bank transfer. Given that specialist value transfer 
agencies in the formal sector – such as Western Union, for example – charge fees of a simi-
lar order, migrant workers have every interest in devising institutional strategies with which to 
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circumvent what amounts to a substantial tax on the product of their hard- earned labour. 
From this perspective the IVTS/Hawala networks which have emerged to serve South Asian, 
Middle Eastern and East African remittance channels during the course of latter part of the 
twentieth century are best regarded as a particularly sophisticated example of transnational 
entrepreneurship. By the turn of the millennium these networks had become extremely so-
phisticated. From a settlement hub based in Dubai, a series of Exchange Houses stood at 
the core of a globally extended IVTS network capable of processing value transfers totalling 
tens, and in all probability hundreds of millions of dollars worth of value transfers on a daily 
basis (Ballard 2005, 2006). Dedicated solely to the task of value transfer, and as proficient in 
handling migrant remittances in the $100 - $500 range as they were in negotiating much lar-
ger values transfers in the reverse direction, these Exchange Houses, together with the glo-
bal network of local agencies operating on their behalf, provided an invaluable service to the 
global community labour migrants. On the one hand hawaladars were in a position to transfer 
value, and to deliver it in the appropriate local currency in the most remote destination (al-
ways provided that they were the source of a significant migratory outflow) within 48 hours. 
No bank accounts were necessary. Indeed hawaladars were often in position to deliver cash 
directly into the hands of the nominated recipient, for a fee which rarely amounted to much 
more than 1 or 2% of the value transmitted, and to do so on a much more reliable basis than 
transfers routed through the formal banking system.  
Nor was that all. One of the reasons why Hawaladars were able to offer such a low-cost va-
lue transfer service is that Hawala networks yet further lowered their overheads by brokering 
a parallel set of value transfers in the reverse direction, mainly on behalf of businesses in 
migrants countries of origin seeking funds denominated in hard currency with which to facili-
tate the settlement of invoices they had received from overseas suppliers from whom they 
had purchased goods an services. Indeed from this perspective the multi-million dollar value 
transfers generated by migrant remittances have played a further vital role in the global fi-
nancial services sector: the provision of capital liquidity to support the ‘informal’ trade of 
goods and services around the entire Indian Ocean region.  
 
Hawala hits the headlines  
Had it not been for the looming contradictions between North and South, together with the 
way in which the lid was blown off them as a consequence of the traumatic impact of the 
events of 9/11, Hawala networks might have been deservedly celebrated as powerful en-
gines behind autonomously generated (and hence non-dependency inducing) processes of 
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economic development. However that was not to be. As the United States struggled to com-
prehend with the implications of an airborne assault on the twin towers and the Pentagon, 
frantic efforts inevitably began to be made to identify the resources on which the perpetrators 
had relied. It did not take long for suspicion to fall on the Hawaladars. 
On September 19th 2001 The Guardian reported that  
The government last night announced a crackdown on money laundering as interna-
tional regulators stepped up their investigation into whether Osama bin Laden specu-
lated in the financial markets ahead of last week's terrorist attacks on New York and 
Washington … The government is also setting up a task force to investigate Hawala 
bankers – a shadowy underground group that allows criminals in the UK to make ille-
gal transactions in other countries without being detected. 
By 8th October it went on to report that 
the strike against the economic foundations of terrorism had already taken a step for-
ward in Washington. "We are going to pursue the financiers of terrorism like they've 
never been pursued before," Paul O'Neill, the US Treasury secretary said, after an 
emergency meeting with his counterparts from the world's seven largest industrialised 
economies…. Experts warn that progress is likely to be slow because searching for 
clues about terrorist funds in the millions of bank transfers and accounts that make up 
the world financial system is like looking for a needle in a haystack. And the informal 
system of international money transfers called Hawala, common throughout the Ara-
bic world, will be a further barrier to tracking down the terrorists' funds. Based on 
trusted long-standing relationships, Hawala transfers leave no paper trail. 
The hunt was on, and a target, no matter how elusive, was in sight. Action swiftly followed. 
By November the US authorities had shut down the al-Barakat network, serving the global 
Somali community, on the grounds that it had been directly involved in financing al-Qaeda 
operations. However those allegations were never substantiated. Indeed when the 9/11 
Commission eventually issued its report, it transpired that the perpetrators had financed their 
operation through wire transfers sent to an account which one of them had opened with the 
Suntrust Bank in California. They had not utilised the resources of the Hawala system.  
 
Nevertheless the ball set rolling by the Patriot Act rapidly developed a momentum of its own, 
and as the War on Terror sank ever deeper into the mire, the need to identify and punish 
scapegoats remained as pressing as ever. A clear indication of the way in which the hunt 
was pursued can be found in the way in which the Department of Homeland Security has 
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celebrated its successes. In a press release headed The USA Patriot Act - a Proven Home-
land Security Tool,7 and dated 14th December 2005 the Department proudly announced that 
Using new provisions of the Patriot Act, the Bureau of Immigration and Customs En-
forcement (ICE) has launched a nationwide campaign against illegal/unlicensed mo-
ney transmittal businesses that has resulted in the arrest of more than 155 individuals 
and 142 criminal indictments, over $25 million in illicit profits seized, and several unli-
censed money transmittal businesses shut down.  
The following are examples of how the Patriot Act facilitated ICE investigations: 
• On September 22, 2005, a key player in a scheme to illegally transfer more than 
$100 million to Pakistan through a New Jersey money transmittal business was 
sentenced to nearly four years in prison as a result of an investigation by ICE and 
IRS agents. Umer Darr, a Pakistani native and naturalized U.S. citizen was first 
arrested in June 2003 along with five other men. ICE agents found that Darr and 
his associates were affiliated with a money transmitting firm called Access Inc. of 
USA, which operated out of a small, upstairs apartment of a suburban house. The 
business kept an unlisted number; did not advertise in the Yellow Pages, and 
could only be accessed through an unmarked rear door. Yet through this small 
hidden business, more than $100 million in virtually untraceable funds were ille-
gally moved to Pakistan. Several defendants in this ongoing case have been con-
victed.  
• On September 16, 2005, a man who testified before the U.S. Senate shortly after 
9/11 about the dangers of unlicensed money transmittal businesses was himself 
sentenced to jail for operating one of these illegal businesses. Rahim Bariek of 
Herndon, Virginia, was sentenced to 18 months in jail for operating an illegal mo-
ney transmitting business (commonly known as “hawala”) without a license, in vio-
lation of provisions of the USA Patriot Act.  
Prosecutions of Pakistanis conducting similar Hawala operations in Britain have also been 
conducted in HM Revenue and Customs; most have been convicted, and if anything with 
even heavier sentences than those handed down in the United States. What is also striking 
is that although the alleged use to which the funds in question were put differed sharply – 
Terrorist funding and the US, and laundering the profits of drug smuggling in the UK – no 
substantive evidence that the funds were actually used for those purposes in either jurisdic-
tion. Instead there is every reason to believe that that all the funds in question were the con-
solidated product of a large number of migrant remittances, in just the same way as those 
which al-Barakat was engaged in delivering.  
Nor has this been the end of the matter. The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, an arm 
of the US Treasury, has been equally active in ensuring that the AML/CFT agenda is rolled 
out on a global basis. In doing so has worked closely with financial authorities all around the 
globe, and not least those in the EU, who have promptly cooperated in turning the screw. A 
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central consequence of this has been the issue of EU regulation No. 1781/2006,8 with the 
apparently arcane title on Information on the payer accompanying transfers of funds. How-
ever the opening paragraph of the document immediately reveals its purpose: 
Whereas: 
(1) Flows of dirty money through transfers of funds can damage the stability and repu-
tation of the financial sector and threaten the internal market. Terrorism shakes the 
very foundations of our society. The soundness, integrity and stability of the system of 
transfers of funds and confidence in the financial system as a whole could be seri-
ously jeopardized by the efforts of criminals and their associates either to disguise the 
origin of criminal proceeds or to transfer funds for terrorist purposes. 
(2) In order to facilitate their criminal activities, money launderers and terrorist financ-
ers could try to take advantage of the freedom of capital movements entailed by the 
integrated financial area, unless certain coordinating measures are adopted at Com-
munity level … Uncoordinated action by Member States alone in the field of cross-
border transfers of funds could have a significant impact on the smooth functioning of 
payment systems at EU level, and therefore damage the internal market in the field of 
financial services. 
(3) In the wake of the terrorist attacks in the USA on 11 September 2001, the extraor-
dinary European Council on 21 September 2001 reiterated that the fight against ter-
rorism is a key objective of the European Union. The European Council approved a 
plan of action dealing with enhanced police and judicial cooperation, developing inter-
national legal instruments against terrorism, preventing terrorist funding, strengthening 
air security and greater consistency between all relevant policies…To that end, meas-
ures aimed at protecting the financial system against the channelling of funds and 
economic resources for terrorist purposes have been taken. Directive 2005/60/EC … 
Those measures do not, however, fully prevent terrorists and other criminals from 
having access to payment systems for moving their funds. 
On the basis of this preamble the document goes on to set out an elaborate set of regula-
tions which will come into force on January 1st 2008. Directed at businesses engaged in 
transferring of funds across the EU’s external borders on behalf of others, it requires all those 
involved to maintain a data-base of each such transfer, noting in each case the identity of the 
payer, the sum transferred, and the identity of the payee, and also to ensure that sum trans-
ferred is tagged in such a way that its provenance and destination can readily be identifies at 
every stage in the transfer process. Each EU state is also instructed to set up a regulatory 
regime to monitor compliance with these requirements, and to penalise all those who fail to 
do so.  
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Globalisation from above: efforts to constrain the operation of informal 
value transfer systems  
So far these regulatory initiatives have attracted remarkably little public attention, let alone 
debate. The requirements they set out are manifestly arcane, and their justification – financial 
transparency – appears on the face of it to be equally innocuous. Nevertheless once consid-
ered from a more global perspective their significance is profound. What we are currently 
witnessing is the construction of a global regulatory regime which seeks to monitor and con-
trol the transfer of value which will run parallel to the system of passports and visas which 
currently serves to monitor, and above all to control, the global flow of persons. Moreover the 
driving force behind these financially oriented developments is identical to that which has 
propelled the intensification passport and visa controls: to contain the transgressive threat 
which the unmonitored flow of value to the established structure of the global economic or-
der.  
Just like the border controls directed at filtering the flow of persons, constraints on the global 
flow of value must by definition take the form of sieves rather than absolute barriers. Their 
objective is to cause the minimum degree of interference to the flow of legitimate, ‘white’, 
transfers, whilst blocking those which the regulatory regime designates as ‘black’. However 
task of establishing whether any given tranche of value should be classified as ‘black’ rather 
than ‘white’ is even more difficult than that of establishing whether or not any given person 
lacks the right to cross an international border. Financial value is merely a medium of ex-
change: it has no inherent colour. Moreover its physical format has become steadily more 
abstract, as bullion has successively been replaced by coins, by currency notes and most 
recently by electronic messages of one sort or another. That said, the underlying problem 
turns out to be remarkably similar to that facing those seeking to manage the migration of 
physical persons: the task distinguishing legitimate sheep from illegitimate goats.  
Managing the passage of persons across international borders is challenging enough: hence 
the successive introduction of passports, of visas, and now the inclusion biometric data to 
which confirms a link between the document and the person presenting it, and – although 
implementation of the program still lies over the horizon – the preparation of global data-
bases which accurately specify whether or not the person holding that biometric id is, or is 
not, a legitimate entrant. What is now beginning to emerge is a parallel financial regime in 
which all transnational value transfers will be similarly ‘tagged’ with the ids of both the sender 
and the recipient. The object of such an exercise, as the preamble to the regulatory directive 
makes clear, is to provide the relevant authorities with a means of inspecting, regulating, and 
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controlling global financial flows which will be every bit as effective – or so it is hoped – as 
those which will be applied to human cross-border movements as and when all passports 
contain machine-readable biometric data. 
Just how realistic is the prospect of implementing such a global inspectorate? Given the sca-
le of the task, doing so would be unthinkable in the absence of heavyweight IT support: hen-
ce the need for machine-readable biometric data in passports, as well equally complex ma-
chinery to check the match between that data on the chip and the person presenting the 
passport. However the task of monitoring global financial flows is much more challenging 
than monitoring the movement of persons, if only because the frequency with which such 
transactions occur is many orders of magnitude larger than that of border-crossing. With that 
in mind, advocates of AML/CFT have spotted a saviour in a further salient feature of the con-
temporary (Northern) order, the declining use of cash as a means of settling transactions. 
Hence a further startling feature of this initiative is to treat the use of coins and currency no-
tes to settle all but the most trivial of transactions as inherently suspicious. If and when all 
significant transactions were to be implemented electronically, the ‘tagging’ requirements set 
out in the latest EU regulations could be implemented with no difficulty: in those circum-
stances all senders and recipients would hold accounts in banks with computerised record 
systems. Of course the whole exercise generate terabytes of data, but in the face of the 
ever-declining cost of electronic storage, archiving such data for five years – as the regula-
tions also require – should not at least in principle present significant technical problems.  
Likewise such a scheme represents – at least in principle – a crime-buster’s dream. Once a 
radical distinction has been drawn between electronically implemented ‘clean’ transactions 
and the cash based products of dirty criminal activities, any strategies which money-
launderers might make to transfer their ill-gotten gains from the latter status to the former 
should be readily detectable. Hence the Office of Financial Education in the US Treasury is 
currently making great efforts to find ways in which the unbanked can be provided with ac-
cess to and/or be persuaded to make routine use of electronic value transfer services, such 
that that those whose sources of income are less than legitimate are rendered ever more 
vulnerable to detection and prosecution. If the dimensions of AML/CFT initiatives with which 
we are concerned here are part and parcel of an effort to roll out these provisions on a global 
basis, the whole program becomes ever more mind-boggling unrealistic – unless one further 
caveat holds. Perhaps the objective here is not so much to police the entire globe, but just as 
in the case of border controls directed at constraining the movement of person, to create 
what can perhaps best be described as gated communities. Could it be that the objective of 
such initiatives is not so much to impose a regulatory order which is equally applicable to all 
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sections of the global population, but rather to keep unwelcome transgressors ‘from below’ 
very firmly at bay, so enabling the current beneficiaries of globalisation to continue to enjoy 
their position on a relatively untroubled basis. 
 
Practical consequences 
Setting these fantasies to one side, it is now becoming clear that the consequences of ever 
more determined efforts to impose ‘immigration controls’ on financial transfers are proving to 
be far from trivial. Whilst the formally constituted financial sector is no stranger to the experi-
ence of being subjected to the demands of market regulators, the demands of AML/CFT 
compliance are proving to be particularly severe. As one recent report puts it 
AML is one of the biggest drivers of increased compliance costs in the West and cer-
tainly smaller banks are beginning to feel the pressure and complain about this new 
regulatory burden. The banking associations have started to take up their grievances 
with supervisors for clearer rules, more supporting information, and paperwork reduc-
tion wherever possible.9  
Yet despite these cries of alarm, the demands of the AML regulatory regime have become 
progressively more intense. Moreover the increased overheads generated by the additional 
bureaucratic activities are proving to be substantial – around £250 million per annum in the 
UK, and of £1.2 billion in the USA, according to one recent estimate.10 Moreover given that 
major financial institutions are congenitally risk-averse, the prospect of falling foul of the 
regulations has begun to provides the financial services sector with yet another incentive to 
withdraw their services from smaller (and hence low-profit) clients, and most especially those 
whom they cannot confidently identify – such as persons of overseas origin or with strange 
sounding names. Likewise financial service providers are equally reluctant to take on cus-
tomers who might cause them to foul of the regulators. Hence an ever increasing number of 
IVTS operators have received notices from their bankers that their business is unwelcome, 
and that a decision has consequently been taken to close their accounts.11 To sum up, the 
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most immediate consequence of the increasing intensity of AML regulations for the formally 
constituted financial services sector has been to raise their overheads, and hence their ser-
vice charges, and to increase their incentive to back away from offering their services low 
net-worth and potentially risky clients. But if major financial institutions have found such de-
velopments manageable, if only because all their competitors had to bear similar costs, all of 
which could readily be passed on to their high net-worth customers, the consequences of 
development further down-market promise to be a great deal more severe.  
As we have seen, operators of IVTS networks have been no slouches in their use of IT to 
facilitate financial transfers. Why, then, should they fall foul of AML/CFT demands for greater 
transparency? The core answer is quite straightforward, and has two components. The first 
has to do with the issue of trust: by deploying relationships of trust wherever possible, ha-
waladars were able dramatically to reduce the expensive clerical procedures typically de-
ployed within the formal sector, such that they could be accused as running ‘systems without 
records’. Although in many respects grossly mistaken, it is nevertheless undoubtedly the 
case that their methods did not lead to each and every transaction being ‘tagged’ in the way 
in which AML procedures require. Secondly, and just as significantly, their reliance on coali-
tions of reciprocity enabled Hawaladars to operate distributed systems with no central regis-
try. Although this was highly efficient in logistical terms, the apparent lack of audit trails led 
investigators to conclude that such networks lacked transparency, and were consequently 
inherently non-compliant with regulatory imperatives. In other words these systems were too 
technically efficient for their own good. Moreover it also followed that if these networks were 
to being themselves into compliance with the new regulatory framework the would not only 
have to radically transform key elements of their established business practices, but that e-
lements which they would have to alter were precisely those which enabled them to offer 
such an effective service to their customers. Despite the crucial significance of the services 
they offered, it is as yet my no means certain as to whether, and in if so in what form such 
initiates can be expected to survive the current regulatory onslaught.  
 
Efforts by the World Bank and DFID to ‘assist’ the poor 
In these circumstances it would have been gratifying to be able to report that as a result of 
their interest in the developmental potential of migrant remittances either the World Bank or 
the UK’s Department for International Development had stepped in to defend these initiatives 
from below. However in the event neither institution proved able to resist the pressures bear-
ing down on them from above.  
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As noted earlier the 2006 edition of Global Development Finance merely nodded towards the 
existence of Hawala/IVTS networks, and made no serious attempt to estimate their scale or 
the basis of their modus operandi. Likewise the Bank has made no comments whatsoever on 
the likely impact of AML/CFT on the informal sector, although it has pulled no punches about 
their likely consequences for its favoured alternative, Micro-Finance Institutions:  
Like any other financial regulation, the costs of complying with AML/CFT measures 
may increase the cost of services. For example, the cost of monitoring suspicious 
transactions may be high if suitable automated systems are not in place. Financial in-
stitutions serving low-income people may have to purchase and install new technol-
ogy or increase their human resource capacity to comply with the requirements in 
their jurisdiction. In addition, rules for reporting and record-keeping may obligate insti-
tutions to save all physical documentation of transactions for defined periods, usually 
at least five years. Microfinance institutions in particular will need to develop systems, 
aided by available software, to reduce the operational cost and time required to com-
ply with this requirement.12 
Remarkably enough, the report also goes on to suggest that however much these additional 
costs may hit the pockets of the MFI’s low-income customers, the installation of expensive IT 
can be justified on the grounds that it will bring them significant benefits:  
Although there are always costs associated with regulations, these costs tend to be 
greater in countries where there is generally a culture of poor compliance. Developing 
or encouraging wider acceptance of compliance, not only for AML/CFT systems, is 
more cost effective because it reduces risk of fraud, helps protect savers and inves-
tors, and increases the integrity of the institution. 
In assessing the significance of this stance, it is worth noting although officials in the relevant 
sections of both the IMF and the World Bank are fully aware of the scale and efficiency with 
which informal networks were capable of delivering remittances directly into the pockets of 
the poor,13 both institutions have maintained a studious silence with respect to the threat 
which the ever greater intensification of the demands of AML/CFT compliance now offers to 
the integrity of their operations.  
Recent policy developments in the UK serve to highlight the way in which one major interna-
tional agency has responded to the pressures thrown up in the aftermath of 9/11. Inspired in 
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part by Ratha’s work, DFID launched a major initiative to highlight the development potential 
of North-South remittances, culminating in a major International Conference in Dacca in June 
2003. However there was very little in the way of a follow-through. Whilst the papers pre-
sented at the Conference (including an analysis which I myself had prepared on DFID’s be-
half) appeared in print two years later,14 by then DFID’s agenda had undergone a sea-
change. Whilst the issue of migrant remittances remained firmly on the table, the earlier in-
terest in exploring and reinforcing their developmental potential had atrophied, to be replaced 
by a focus on their transmission – and most particularly with the provision of advice to UK-
resident migrants as to how their savings could best be delivered safely and cheaply to their 
kinsfolk back home; moreover just as in the case of the World Bank, the fact that virtually all 
settler communities of any size had already devised an effective means of doing just that 
was studiously overlooked. I was not alone in finding DFID’s change of course bewildering: if 
migrants had significant concerns about issues in this sphere, it was with respect to the ex-
ceedingly high fees which the formal banking sector charged for access to its value trans-
mission services.15  
Given its change of emphasis, DFID’s has invested heavily in developing a well publicised 
Send Money Home initiative, which presents itself as offering migrant workers resident in the 
UK with information about cheapest and most reliable means transferring remittances to their 
homelands. Remarkably enough, the market research agency tasked to generate compara-
tive data on the cost of transferring funds through the various service providers operating in 
the remittance market wholly overlooked those located in the informal sector.16 As a result 
that project’s recently published advisory pamphlets make no mention of the availability of 
these facilities,17 despite the fact virtually every ethnic colony in the UK is served by at least 
one specialist IVTS operator. Hence the best that can be said about DFID’s Send Money 
Home operation is that will provide those who currently utilise the services of the cheapest 
and most efficient service providers with a convenient back stop should the new regulatory 
regime succeed in driving their preferred providers out of the marketplace. However much 
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such an outcome might satisfy the US Treasury – as well as the service providers in the for-
mal sector who can hope to gather in flocks of additional customers – it is hard to discern 
how the diversion of funds through more expensive formal channels would in any way en-
hance the development potential of outbound remittances from the UK.  
  
Current efforts to control the onrush of globalisation  
So far this paper has effectively been concerned with the dynamics of what might seem at 
first sight to be some minor, or at least relatively arcane, parochial skirmishes which have 
accompanied contemporary processes of globalisation. In my view such a judgement is seri-
ously mistaken, as is immediately apparent when we look beyond the multiplicity of bushes 
undergrowth in which these skirmishes are taking place, and instead seek to locate these 
developments within the structure of the overarching forest. Whilst the migrant worker-driven 
components of globalisation may at first sight seem small beer when set against the role of 
China in manufacturing and India in software, the challenges to the established global pat-
terns in the distribution of wealth and power that such migrants and their offspring have also 
begun to precipitate are proving to be no less momentous. In raw financial terms, the reverse 
value flows precipitated by their efforts – currently running to no more than a few hundred 
billion dollars per annum – may be dwarfed into seeming insignificance by those generated 
by Southern activity in manufacturing and software, but nevertheless both the way in which 
those finds are generated, as well as their destination are of the utmost significance. Not only 
are generated by transgressors who have breached the physical barriers designed to keep 
Southern invaders at bay, but the recipients of a substantial part of those funds are not 
members of the new elites in Bangalore and Shanghai, but poor peasant families way out on 
the global periphery: the South of the South.  
Moreover there are now good reasons to conclude that these developments in the under-
growth have now got the North running scared. All northern jurisdictions are now making 
huge efforts to regain control of their borders by yet further reinforcing the scale and sophisti-
cation of their sieves. It remains to be seen whether their current efforts to keep transgres-
sive entrepreneurs from below at bay will prove to be any more successful than their prede-
cessors; however what is clear is that in this sphere as in so many others, those transgres-
sors’ chances of success are being steadily reinforced a crucial further development: the 
ever growing scale of the number of ethnic allies on the far side of the border who are both 
able and willing to assist them. Despite ever heavier levels of investment, borders – a crucial 
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barrier to the realisation of the egalitarian potentialities of globalisation – are being steadily 
eroded by these processes.  
But since it is money that makes the world – and especially the capitalist world – go round, it 
should come as no surprise that as these physical defences of privilege are steadily eroded, 
the powers that that be should have turned their attention to the prospect of controlling the 
circulation of value as a means of defending their position of financial privilege. On the face it 
controlling the transnational circulation of value would seem to be an even more unrealistic 
goal than that of bringing international migration under control. Unlike people, value – espe-
cially in substantial quantities – has no physical substance in the contemporary world. Hence 
whilst its arrival and departure has no less real an impact than does the movement of physi-
cal persons, its transit is infinitely more difficult to identify and control. Furthermore value be-
comes yet more elusive in transnational contexts, given that all forex transactions are by de-
finition zero-sum swaps – the very phenomenon of which Hawaladars take direct advantage 
as they set about brokering back-to-back swaps, such that all transfer of currency notes are 
implemented on a local, rather than an a transnational basis.18  
But if global Hawaladars are busy brokering multi-million dollar scale value swaps of the sa-
me general kind as those implemented by aggressive and bushy-tailed of International bank-
ers, a further point swims into focus. If Hawaladars are indeed able to deploy ‘informal’ (but 
in fact highly sophisticated) operational procedures in such a way as to significantly cut their 
back-office costs as compared with those incurred with the rivals in the more sclerotically 
organised formal sector, could it be that the contest between them parallels the current con-
frontation between Toyota and General Motors? If that is indeed the case, it is becomes eas-
ier to comprehend the US Treasury’s current commitment to the enforcement of AML/CFT 
regulations on a global scale. Could it be that the perverse success of a bunch of Islamic 
terrorists bringing down the twin towers has simply provided a convenient peg on which to 
hang a much larger agenda? If one’s ultimate objective is to establish a globally regulatory 
framework which will serve to protect the global hegemony of the debt-ridden New York Fed, 
as well as to defend the profitability of the Bank of America, Goldman Sachs and the many 
other bulls of Wall Street and the City of London, there can hardly be a better excuse for 
radical interventions in global financial markets than to suggest that one is only doing so to 
keep the depredations of terrorists and drugs smugglers at bay.  
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Yet what are the prospects of actually implementing such an exercise? Given that the vol-
ume of foreign exchange transactions in currently estimated to be in excess of $2 trillion per 
day, the prospect that the masters of the international banking system might go to such 
lengths to close down – or to but it more precisely, to reincorporate into the ‘transparent’ and 
hence legitimate stream of value transfers – as sum as piffling as $250 billion per annum 
might hardly seem to be worth the candle. Moreover however laudable the objective of crack-
ing down on drug smuggling an organised crime may be, the prospect that efforts to ‘crack 
down on their financial sinews will meet with any degree of success appears to be remote. 
As a report by two well-laced commentators recently concluded:  
After over 20 years of money laundering prevention, the results are disappointing: or-
ganised crime and drug trafficking still prosper. Banks face a high burden because of 
their active involvement in money laundering prevention. The various prevention 
schemes have weakened the basic rights of the bank clients, who have to pay for the 
prevention measures. Of course, there has been some success. Compared to the di-
rect and indirect costs as well as to the estimated volume of organised crime, the vic-
tories are minor and the costs are high.19 
Once placed in a more global perspective, however, these costs swim into focus as a worth-
while investment as part and parcel of efforts to contain a much larger and more sustained 
threat to the interests of the powers that be: those which are being precipitated by the entre-
preneurial efforts – and indeed the by growing levels of success – achieved by those en-
gaged in transgressive processes of globalisation from below. It follows that if my analysis is 
anywhere near correct, efforts to tag and monitoring financial flows are emerging as crucial 
to current efforts to sustain the North’s comfortable position of socio-economic hegemony as 
are current efforts to tag, monitor, and hence to control the flow of persons of Southern origin 
across its borders, and indeed to ensure that the WTO does not dismantle the way in which 
world trade in agricultural products is constrained and ordered by a subsidy and tariff regime 
was has been deliberately constructed protect the interests of Northern farmers. . If so, mi-
gration-management and AML/CFT can be seen to provide structurally similar bastions 
aimed at ensuring that processes of globalisation are ordered in such a way as to bring dis-
proportionate benefits to some to the equally serious disadvantage of others, and to provide 
a legitimate means of directing criminal sanctions against those who have the temerity to 
attempt seriously transgress the established global order.  
 
                                               
19  Geiger, H and Wuensch, O., (2007) “The Fight against money-laundering: and economic analysis paradoxon” 
Journal of Money Laundering Control Vol.10, 1 pp. 99 – 105.  
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The benefits of globalisation: now you see them – and now you don’t 
From this perspective globalisation begins to look more and more like a hall of mirrors. At 
least in principle the world’s current condition of globalisation is a product of the ever freer 
movement of persons, goods, capital and ideas around the globe. However a focus on mi-
grants and their doings reminds us that in this sphere – as in so many others where Northern 
and Southern interests stand in contradiction to one another – freedom of movement is be-
coming an ever more contentious issue. Of course the North retains a strong ideological 
commitment to the principal of the freedom of movement: to do otherwise would wholly un-
dermine innumerable aspects of the privileged position which its fully signed up members 
currently occupy within the global socio-economic order. However close inspection soon re-
veals that that commitment is further conditioned by a crucial proviso: free movement is only 
acceptable when the movement in question is classed as legitimate.  
Hence although the scale on which persons, goods, capital and ideas have begun to move 
around the world has become mind-boggling intense in recent years, these movements have 
simultaneously been rendered subject to ever tighter controls. These controls have not been 
directed at inhibiting personal freedom: Northern ideology insists that the maximisation of 
opportunities for personal freedom is one of our highest values, and nothing should be al-
lowed to inhibit that. However the events of 9/11 have provided the North with an opportunity 
to add a caveat to that ringing declaration: unless such movements undermine the security of 
civilization itself. In other words the security agenda out-trumps all others. Hence our con-
temporary condition of globalisation is also underpinned by a whole series of increasingly 
well-organised efforts to restrict the freedom of movement of persons, goods, capital and 
even of ideas, above all when such movements emanate by, from, and within the South, and 
appear significantly to undermine Northern interests of any kind.  
The driving forces behind these developments should by now be plain. Thanks to the pro-
gressive collapse of Euro-American imperial project in the aftermath of the Second World 
War, successful entrepreneurs bursting upwards and outwards from the South and East ha-
ve mounted ever more transgressive challenges to the still-expanding conditions of privilege 
enjoyed by the North and West. But precisely because of the interdependencies and fluidity 
which are part and parcel of the contemporary global order, the North has found it quite im-
possible to keep the transgressors outside the gate, or even to require those who have pene-
trated its wall to ‘join the club’ by conforming to the global establishment’s precepts and ex-
pectations. A complex dialectic of challenge, resistance and counter-challenge has conse-
quently emerged, on some of the more significant parts of which this paper has sought to 
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focus. But if the equality-precipitating potential of globalisation still has far to go, the very 
prospect of such an outcome has yet further intensified the North/South and East/West con-
tradictions which were initially opened up by European colonial expansion. Whilst the post-
war collapse of the formal dimensions of that project has opened up all sorts of novel oppor-
tunities for successful entrepreneurship from below, the events of 9/11 have provided those 
nominally committed to global freedom a heaven-sent – or more likely a devil-sent – oppor-
tunity to tighten the regulatory screws bearing down on all those who had the temerity to use 
their freedom in such a way as to challenge the established order.  
In the midst of all this the likely course of future developments remains hard to discern. At 
present all sides are moving forward with bewildering speed, so much so that the dialectics 
of challenge, containment, resistance and counter-reaction have already begun to undermine 
the utility of spatially-grounded disjunctions between North and South, East and West as 
analytical descriptors. Hence, for example, members of southern and eastern elites are now 
often just as ardent supporters of screw-tightening as are their counterparts in the North and 
West – always provided that their own freedom of movement – whether of their persons or 
their capital – is not significant inhibited.  
It was ever thus. La Lutta Continua – albeit within an ever more globalised arena. 
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